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AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION v RENO, PROTECTING
PRODUCERS AGAINST "INFRINGEMENT" OR
CHILDREN AGAINST "VULNERABILITY?"
FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES
SURROUNDING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
Child pornography is a critical problem facing contemporary
society.' With advances in accessing pornography from computer
databases, children are more vulnerable than ever. 2 In response to
these concerns, Congress has made several efforts to protect chil-
dren from becoming vulnerable to sexual exploitation. These con-
gressional efforts have resulted in the enactment of the Child
Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, and the Child
Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990
(Child Protection Act or section 2257).3 A primary feature of the
Child Protection Act is the record-keeping requirements. The rec-
ord-keeping provisions require all persons producing material con-
taining visual depictions of actual explicit sexual activity to: (1)
determine the age of the performers; (2) maintain records contain-
1. See generally Kenneth V. Lanning, Child Molestors: A Behavioral Analysis, DEVi-
ANT AND CRIMINAL SExuALrry 239 (NCAVC, 1987) (discussing exploitation of chil-
dren). According to a recent NEXIS search, over 1,971 articles have emerged
since January 1995 in major newspapers concerning child pornography. This large
volume of articles illustrates society's concern with this problem. Child pornogra-
phy is associated with the great number of missing children and convicted
pedophiles in America each year. According to Kenneth V. Lanning, an FBI agent
at the Behavioral Science Unit in Quantico, Virginia, "[t] he link between missing
and sexually exploited children is a strong one." Id. at 243. Agent Lanning also
states that "[c]hildren in pubescent or technical pornography .... [are] more
likely to be missing children -especially runaways or throwaways being exploited by
morally indiscriminate pimps or profiteers." Id. at 262. The Exploited and Missing
Child Unit in Louisville, Kentucky conducted a study which indicated that 85% of
the commercially exploited children studied were classified as "missing at the time
of the exploitation offense." Id. at 243.
Child molesters and pedophiles are also linked to child pornography. Agent
Lanning states that "[c]hild pornographers are usually child molestors." Id. at 269.
He also states, "in most cases the arousal and fantasy fueled by the pornography is
only a prelude to actual sexual activity with children." Id. at 265.
2. Id. at 266. Computers make it easy for pedophiles to organize their collec-
tions of child pornography. As FBI Agent Lanning states, "[a] computer makes it
much easier to store and retrieve names and addresses of victims and other
pedophiles. Innumerable characteristics of victims and sexual acts can be easily
recorded and analyzed. An extensive pornography collection can be catalogued
by subject matter." Id.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
(589)
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ing this information; and (3) affix to each copy of the material a
statement about where these records could be found.4
Challengers of the Child Protection Act argue that the record-
keeping provisions overly burden and unconstitutionally restrict the
First Amendment rights of producers of sexually explicit materials.
American Library Ass'n v. Reno,5 the topic of this Note, addresses the
level of scrutiny which should be applied to record-keeping legisla-
tion in this area. First, this Note traces the development of child
pornography laws and First Amendment tests of scrutiny. This
Note then explores the reasoning of American Library Ass'n. Finally,
this Note examines the holding of American Library Ass'n and investi-
gates its constitutional and social impact.
II. FACTS
American Library Ass'n v. Reno involved a class action suit
headed by the American Library Association against the United
States Attorney General and other federal officials responsible for
enforcing, among other provisions, the record-keeping provisions
of the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988.6
This suit originated in American Library Ass'n v. Thornburgh.7
Therein, associations representing producers and distributors of
films first challenged the constitutionality of the record-keeping
provisions of the Child Protection Act.8 The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia granted the associations' motion
for preliminary injunction and summary judgment and held that
the record-keeping provisions violated producers' rights to due pro-
cess.9 The government appealed the district court's decision.
4. Id. For a detailed analysis of the record-keeping provisions, see infra notes
23-25 and accompanying text.
5. 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2610 (1995).
6. Id. at 78. Other challengers in this suit included the Freedom to Read
Foundation, the American Society of Magazine Editors, the American Society of
Magazine Photographers, the Council for Periodical Distributors Associations,
Inc., the International Periodical Distributors Association, Inc., the Magazine Pub-
lishers of America and the American Booksellers Association, Inc. Id. at 81. The
action was brought against William P. Barr, the predecessor to the current United
States Attorney General, Janet Reno. Id.
7. 713 F. Supp. 469 (D.C. 1989). Richard Thornburgh held the position of
Attorney General before William P. Barr and the current Attorney General, Janet
Reno.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 472.
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While cross appeals were pending, Congress amended the rec-
ord-keeping section. 10 Thereafter, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit held in American Library
Ass'n v. Barr" that the claims attacking the record-keeping provi-
sions were moot due to the enactment of new legislation concern-
ing the record-keeping provisions.' 2 The court of appeals vacated
the portion of the judgment concerning the 1988 Act's record-
keeping provisions and remanded the case with instructions to dis-
miss the corresponding portion of the plaintiffs' complaint.'3 On
remand, the district court held (1) the new record-keeping require-
ments were not narrowly tailored to the statutory purpose of pro-
tecting children and (2) the requirements imposed an excessive
burden on the adult models and producers. 14 Therefore, the re-
quirements could not be upheld as a valid time, place and manner
restriction.' 5 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit ruled in American Library
Ass'n v. Reno that the requirements were narrowly tailored and suffi-
ciently furthered governmental interest in abating child pornogra-
phy to withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment.' 6
10. This amendment resulted in the Child Protection Restoration and Penal-
ties Enhancement Act of 1990, the statute which the court examined in American
Library Ass'n v. Reno. For a further discussion of this Act, see infra notes 23-25.
11. 956 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
12. Id. at 1186.
13. Id. at 1187.
14. American Library Ass'n v. Barr, 794 F. Supp. 412, 419 (D.C. 1992).
15. Id. A "time, place and manner" restriction must satisfy a three-part test:
(1) it must be content-neutral; that is, it must be independent of the speech's
communicative content; (2) it must be "narrowly tailored" to serve a "significant
governmental interest;" and (3) it must " 'leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information.' " Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S.
490, 516 (1981) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Counsel, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). When a regulation is "narrowly tailored" to
serve such an interest, the interest cannot be equally well served by a means that is
substantively less intrusive of First Amendment interests. See Clark v. Community
For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (discussing "narrowly tailored"
standard). The district court in Barr did not find the second prong satisfied; there-
fore, the new record-keeping requirements were held unconstitutional. American
Library Ass'n v. Barr, 794 F. Supp. at 419.
16. American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d at 94. The court of appeals also
held in American Library Ass'n the following: (1) the action was not a facial chal-
lenge (challenged as unconstitutional on its face because of its overbreadth or
vagueness) so the plaintiffs were not required to establish that the Act was uncon-
stitutional in every conceivable application; (2) the requirement that the produ-
cers keep records of a performer's age as long as the producer remains in business
is unduly burdensome; therefore, a five year requirement to hold records should
be imposed; (3) the Act does not apply to those who provide services for produ-
cers, it applies to primary and secondary producers only; and (4) the application
of the Act to foreign producers does not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 83-94.
In American Library Ass'n, the request for rehearing en banc was denied.
American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 47 F.3d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Judge Tatel wrote
1996]
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III. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
In order to combat the sexual exploitation of children, Con-
gress has enacted legislation targeting producers and distributors of
child pornography. 17 First, Congress responded with the Protec-
tion of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 (1977
Act), which prohibited both the production and distribution of
"sexually explicit" material involving children.18 Second, Congress
enacted the Child Protection Act of 198419 which expanded the
prior act by prohibiting such material regardless of whether the ma-
terial was deemed "obscene."20 Third, Congress passed the Child
Obscenity Protection and Enforcement Act of 1988 to address a
particular problem that hindered the prosecution of child pornog-
raphy offenses. 21 The Attorney General's Commission on Pornog-
a strong dissenting opinion in this action. Id. at 1216 (Tatel,J., dissenting). For a
further discussion ofJudge Tatel's dissent, see infra notes 105-111 and accompany-
ing text. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on the plaintiffs' appeal. Ameri-
can Library Ass'n v. Reno, 115 S. Ct. 2610 (1995).
17. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95225, § 2253, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-
2257 (1988)).
18. 92 Stat. 8. The 1977 Act defines "sexually explicit conduct" as actual or
simulated - (1) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-geni-
tal, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; (2) bestial-
ity; (3) masturbation; (4) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (5) lascivious exhibition
of the genitals or pubic area of any person. Id.
Congress added three more sections to the 1977 Act in an effort to eliminate
the " 'highly organized multimillion dollar industries' "involved in child pornogra-
phy. American Library Ass'n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178, 1181 (1992) (quoting S. REP.
No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977)). Section 2251 of the 1977 Act prohibited
the use of minors in "sexually explicit" productions, and prohibited parents and
guardians from allowing their children to be used in such productions. Id. Sec-
tion 2252 made it a federal crime to transport, ship or receive in interstate com-
merce for the purpose of selling any " 'obscene visual or print medium'" if its
production involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Id
Section 2256, formerly 18 U.S.C. § 2253 (2) (A)-(E), contained definitions includ-
ing the following: " '[m]inor' meant anyone under the age of sixteen years;
'[p]roducing' meant manufacturing or issuing 'for pecuniary profit'; and
'[s] exually explicit conduct' comprehended five categories of activity: sexual inter-
course, bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, and 'lewd' exhibition of
the genitals or pubic area." Id.
19. Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984).
20. American Library Ass'n v. Barr, 956 F.2d at 1182. This Act also increased
the maximum fines tenfold, redefined "minor" to mean anyone under the age of
18, replaced the word "lewd" with the word "lascivious" in the definition of sexually
explicit conduct, and eliminated the criminal offense condition requiring "pecuni-
ary profit." Id. For a full discussion of obscenity as an "unprotected" area under
the First Amendment, see infta notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
21. Id. Congress passed this Act on the recommendation of the Attorney
General's Commission on Pornography. Id. For a full discussion of the Commis-
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raphy found that producers were able to avoid prosecution by
claiming ignorance of a child performer's true age and asserting
that they had been deceived.22 To eliminate this loophole, the
1988 Act required producers to maintain records of the names and
ages of the performers and indicate on each copy of the material
where those records are kept.23 Lastly, in response to numerous
challenges and appeals to the constitutionality of the 1988 provi-
sions, Congress enacted the Child Protection Restoration and Pen-
alties Enhancement Act of 1990.24 This Act "significantly altered"
the "scope and burden" of the original record-keeping
requirements. 25
sion's findings, see 1 D.O.J., A-rroRNEv GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY:
FINAL REPORT, 405-06 (1986) [hereinafter ATroRNEY GErNERA'S COMMISSION ON
PORNOGRAPHY].
22. ATiroRNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 21, at 405-
06.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (1988).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
25. Id. The revisions contained within the 1990 Act provide that producers of
materials covered by the Act must, for every performer:
(1) ascertain, by examination of an identification document containing
such information, the performer's name and date of birth, and require
the performer to provide such other indicia of his or her identity as may
be prescribed by regulation; (2) ascertain any name, other than the per-
former's present and correct name, ever used by the performer including
maiden name, alias, nickname, stage, or professional name; and (3) rec-
ord in the records required by section (a) the information required by
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection and such other identifying in-
formation as may be prescribed by regulation.
18 U.S.C. § 2257(b).
The Act further provides that producers must also:
cause to be affixed to every copy of any matter described in paragraph (1)
of subsection (a) of this section, in such a manner and in such form as
the Attorney General shall by regulations prescribe, a statement describ-
ing where the records required by this section with respect to all perform-
ers depicted in that copy of the matter may be located.
18 U.S.C. § 2257(e).
The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography made the following
recommendations:
The recommended legislation would require producers to obtain release
forms from each performer with proof of age. The forms would be filed
at a specified location listed in the opening or closing footage of a film,
the inside cover of the magazine or standard locations in or on other
material containing visual depictions.
The name, official title and location of the responsible person or
corporate agent supervising such records would also be listed to avoid use
of corporate shields. The release forms should be available for inspection
by any duly authorized law enforcement officer upon demand as a regula-
tory function for the limited purposes of determining consent and proof
of age ....
A producer should be required to maintain these records for a mini-
mum period of five years .... This legislation would not only protect
1996]
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B. First Amendment Background
In order to determine whether the record-keeping provisions
unconstitutionally restrict the producers' protected speech, an anal-
ysis of First Amendment protections is necessary. The threshold in-
quiry in any First Amendment issue focuses on the appropriate level
of scrutiny to apply to governmental restrictions in such an area.2 6
"[T] he appropriate level of scrutiny is initially tied to whether the
statute distinguished between prohibited and permitted speech on
the basis of content."2 7 Content-based restrictions, in which the
government restricts speech because of the ideas or information
contained therein or because of the general subject matter ex-
pressed, are subject to strict scrutiny.28 Such restrictions are pre-
sumptively invalid and will only survive judicial scrutiny if the
regulation promotes a compelling state interest and employs the
least restrictive means to furthering that interest.2 9 Content-neutral
restrictions, on the other hand, in which the government restricts a
form of expression for reasons not related to the particular content
of the speech, are subject to intermediate scrutiny.30 Such restric-
tions must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
minors from abuse, but it would also place the burden of ensuring this
protection was implemented squarely on the producers of the materials.
The proposed legislation would serve a record keeping purpose compara-
ble to that found in environmental and similar statutes ....
ATroRNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPH-Y, supra note 21, at 621-22.
26. SeeFrisbyv. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988). In Frisy, the Court upheld
an ordinance which prevented anti-abortion activists from picketing the residence
of a doctor who performed abortions. Id. at 488.
27. Id. at 481.
28. Id.; Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976). Virginia Pharmacy is a case involving content-based restrictions.
Id. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court invalidated a restriction by the state of Virginia
that forbade pharmacists to advertise the prices of prescription drugs because the
state feared that its citizens would buy drugs at the lowest available price and ig-
nore quality and service. Id. at 773. The Court held that truthful commercial
speech is protected by the First Amendment and cannot be restricted because of
its content. Id.
Another case involving a content-based restriction is Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen, the Court overturned the defendant's conviction for
violating an "offensive conduct" statute by wearing a jacket bearing the words
"Fuck The Draft" in a county courthouse. Id. at 25-26. The Court held that pro-
fane, offensive language is nonetheless First Amendment speech, and may not be
suppressed under the guise of regulating the "manner" of speech. Id.
29. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). Most regu-
lations do not survive strict scrutiny due to its heightened standard. An exception
is Simon & Schuster v. New York State Crime Victims' Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
For a discussion of Simon & Schuster, see infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
30. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
[Vol. III: p. 589
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interest and must leave open ample alternative channels for com-
munication of the information.31
Time, place and manner restrictions often fall into the inter-
mediate scrutiny category. One such restriction involves govern-
ment regulations aimed at avoiding either some evil unconnected
with the speech's content, or some secondary effect of the speech.
A zoning restriction placed on adult entertainment theaters in a
particular area in order to avoid crime or deterioration of property
values is an example of such a regulation.32
The United States v. O'Brien test is an additional constitutional
test employed to evaluate governmental restrictions which involve
both protected speech and non-protected speech.33 This four-part
test asks the following questions: (1) Is the governmental regulation
within the constitutional power of the government? (2) Does the
regulation further an important or substantial governmental inter-
est? (3) Is the interest unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion? (4) Is the incidental restriction on the First Amendment no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest?34
31. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). The Court in
Ward upheld a requirement that any musician performing in New York City's Cen-
tral Park, a public forum, use city-provided sound equipment and technicians. Id.
at 803. The Court reasoned that the city had a significant governmental interest in
protecting its citizens from unduly loud noises, and the restriction was not substan-
tially broader than necessary to achieve that interest. Id. For a further discussion
of the intermediate scrutiny test, specifically the "time, place and manner" restric-
tion test, see supra note 15.
32. See Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In Young,
Detroit's "anti-skid row ordinance," which required theaters specializing in adult
movies to be geographically dispersed from each other and from other adult book-
stores, was held to be a valid content-neutral time, place and manner regulation.
Id. at 71. See also Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (zoning
ordinance barring adult movie theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any resi-
dence, church, park or school deemed valid content-neutral time, place and man-
ner regulation).
33. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Therein, the Court upheld
a law that prohibited the destruction of Selective Service registration certificates-
draft cards. Id. at 386.
34. Id. at 377. Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), involved a
statute held constitutional because it satisfied the O'Brien test. Id. at 567. The
statute at issue in Barnes was Indiana's "public indecency" statute. Id. at 563. This
statute made it a misdemeanor to appear nude in a public place. Id. at 572 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). The statute was challenged by two strip clubs. Id. at 562-63. Under
the statute, a woman is deemed "nude" if she appears in public without wearing
"pasties" and a "G-string." Id. at 563. The majority held that the O'Brien test was
satisfied because the requirement: (1) furthers an "important or substantial gov-
ernmental interest" of protecting order and morality and (2) the "incidental" re-
striction, requiring a small amount of covering, was no greater than essential to the
furtherance of the important governmental interest. Id. at 569-72.
1996]
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In addition, several areas of speech are deemed "unprotected"
and warrant no First Amendment protection.35 Two "unprotected"
areas of significant concern are obscenity and child pornography.36
The Miller v. Calfornia test is used to identify material which may be
banned for being obscene.3 7 To be deemed obscene, this test re-
quires the following: (1) the "'average person applying contempo-
rary community standards' would find that 'the work taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest;'" (2) the work "depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically de-
fined by the applicable state law" and (3) the work, "taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."3 8
Child pornography was specifically deemed an "unprotected"
category after New York v. Ferber.39 Ferber stands for the proposition
35. "Unprotected" areas include obscenity, fraudulent misrepresentation, def-
amation, advocacy of imminent lawless behavior, "fighting words" and child por-
nography. For a full discussion of the unprotected areas of obscenity and child
pornography, see infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (addressing porno-
graphic depictions of children); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (address-
ing obscene books and magazines).
37. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The Miller test has three prongs. All three prongs
must be met to identify material which should be banned as obscene. Id. The
Miller test's first prong inquiring whether the "average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards" would find that "the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest" is directly adopted from Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957). Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
38. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The term "prurient" was defined by the Supreme
Court in Roth as "material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts" from the
"average person" whose attitudes reflect current community standards. Roth, 354
U.S. at 487-89. The Court in Miller added that the standards that count are those
of the "local community" where the prosecution is taking place. Miller, 413 U.S. at
32 n.13. In addition, the Miller Court extended the definition to include those
works which are not "utterly" without social value, but which do not have "serious"
value. Id. at 24-25.
39. 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). The Court set forth five reasons which warrant
child pornography "unprotected." First, the Court reasoned that the state has a
compelling interest in safeguarding the physical and emotional well-being of mi-
nors within the state. Id. at 756-57. The Court noted that legislation aimed at
protecting the physical and emotional well-being of the youth had been upheld
even when the laws interfered with constitutionally protected rights. Id. at 7517.
Second, the Court found that the distribution of photos and films depicting a
child's sexual activity intrinsically relates to the sexual abuse of children in two
ways: (1) the materials produced are a permanent record of the child's participa-
tion in the sexual performance and (2) the circulation of the material exacerbates
the harm to the child. Id. at 759. Furthermore, the only practical method of con-
trolling sexual abuse of children used in child pornography is to stop the distribu-
tion network by imposing criminal penalties on persons involved in the
distribution of child pornography. Id. at 760.
Third, the Court found that the promotion and distribution of child pornog-
raphy provides an economic motive for the production of child pornography. Id.
at 761. The Court stated that First Amendment protection does not extend to
speech used as an integral part of conduct that violates a valid criminal statute. Id.
[Vol. III: p. 589
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that a state may ban the distribution of materials showing children
engaged in sexual conduct, even though the material is not ob-
scene.4° The Ferber Court relied on the state's compelling and "sur-
passingly important" interest in preventing the sexual exploitation
and abuse of children who are photographed for the production of
such materials. 41 The Court held that the First Amendment value
of permitting children to be photographed in such performances is
"exceedingly modest, if not de minimis."42 Therefore, the produc-
tion of child pornography is an "unprotected" category of speech
that may be banned. 43
C. Additional Child Pornography Cases
Two additional child pornography cases are relevant when dis-
cussing First Amendment issues. First, United States v. United States
District Court for the Central District of California responded to issues
untouched by Ferber.44 Central District addressed whether a child
pornography producer could defend against federal prosecution by
demonstrating that he reasonably believed the performer to be of
the age required by Congress. 45 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that knowledge of a minor's age, or
scienter, is not necessary to convict for the production of child por-
nography materials.46 The Ninth Circuit found a very narrow con-
at 762. Since the production of child pornography is illegal, and promotion and
distribution of child pornography is an integral part of production, the Court rea-
soned that the First Amendment protection should not extend to the promotion
and distribution of child pornography. Id.
Fourth, the Court found the value of materials depicting children engaged in
sexual conduct to be very modest, if not "de minimis." Id. The Court stated that
visual depictions of children engaging in sexual conduct seldom constitute an im-
portant and necessary part of literary, scientific or educational work. Id. at 762-63.
Finally, the Court concluded that recognizing child pornography as outside
First Amendment protection was not incompatible with earlier court decisions. Id.
at 763. The Court contended that it was not unusual for a content-based classifica-
tion of speech to be found outside First Amendment protection when the evil to
be restricted overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests. Id. at 763-64.
40. Id. at 759-64.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 763.
43. Id. at 764.
44. 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988). Central District involved prosecution under
the Child Protection Act ofJames Marvin Souter, Jr., a so-called "talent agent" and
two producers for hiring Traci Lords, a 16-year old minor, to appear in a sexually
explicit film entitled Those Young Girls. Id. at 536. The defendants' main argument
centered around an assertion that because they were "seriously misled" as to the
actress's age, the government must prove knowledge of age, or scienter, as part of
its prima facie case. Id.
45. Id..
46. Id. at 537-38.
1996] 597
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stitutional right to a mistake of age defense. 47 A defendant may
avoid conviction only by showing "clear and convincing" evidence
that he did not know, and could not have reasonably learned, that
the performer was a minor.48
The Supreme Court also addressed the scienter requirement
in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. 49 In X-Citement Video, the
Court held that the term "knowingly," as used in a particular stat-
ute, applied to the elements of crime concerning the minority of
performers and sexually explicit nature of the material, not only to
the transportation element.50 Despite the Ninth Circuit's ruling in
Central District, the Supreme Court held that "knowledge" is a neces-
sary element for conviction of child pornography.51
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Narrative Analysis
1. Standard of Review
The court in American Library Ass'n first determined the level of
scrutiny applicable to the Child Protection Act's record-keeping
and disclosure requirements. 52 The court noted that" 'because not
every interference with speech triggers the same degree of scrutiny
under the First Amendment, we must decide at the outset the level
of scrutiny applicable.' ,,3 The court distinguished between con-
47. Id. at 543.
48. Id.
49. 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994). Respondents were convicted under the Protection
of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977. Id. at 466. This Act prohib-
ited the transportation, receipt, distribution or reproduction of a visual depiction
if the depiction "involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct."
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a). The Supreme Court, however, reversed the conviction and
held that "the term 'knowingly' in § 2252 extends both to the sexually explicit
nature of the material and to the age of the performer." X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct.
at 472.
50. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 467. The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning and held that the term "knowingly" does not apply; rather, it modifies
"transports, ships, receives, distributes, or produces." Id. The Court held that this
could not be Congress' intent, for it would be "odd ... that Congress distinguished
between someone who inadvertently dropped at item into the mail without realiz-
ing it, but was nevertheless unconcerned about whether the person had any knowl-
edge of the prohibited contents of the package." Id.
51. Id. at 472.
52. American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 2610 (1995).
53. Id. at 84 (quoting Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445,
2456 (1994)). For a further discussion of Turner Broadcasting, see Holli K. Sands,
Note, The Supreme Court Turns Its Back on the First Amendment, The 1992 Cable Act and
the First Amendment: Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 3 VILL. SPORTS &
Err. L.J. 295 (1996).
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tent-based restrictions and content-neutral restrictions.54 Content-
based restrictions survive constitutional review "only if they pro-
mote a 'compelling interest' and employ 'the least restrictive means
to further the articulated interest.' -55 In contrast, the court stated,
" 'regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are sub-
ject to an intermediate level of scrutiny because in most cases they
pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints
from the public dialogue.' -56 Noting that this determination is not
always a simple task, the court focused on the purpose of the legisla-
tion.57 " 'A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the con-
tent of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental
effect on some speakers or messages but not others.' ",58
The court discussed two cases, United States v. O'Brien59 and City
of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.,60 as relevant to this inquiry. The
Court held in O'Brien that if "speech" and "non-speech" elements
were combined in a course of action, an important non-speech ele-
ment could justify incidental limitations on First Amendment free-
doms.6 1 In City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, the Court added that
regulations should be upheld as long as the justifications for the
regulation had nothing to do with the content of the speech, but
rather focused on the secondary effects of the speech.62 The court
in American Library Ass'n compared section 2257 to the zoning ordi-
54. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 84.
55. Id. (quoting Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
56. Id. (quoting Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2445).
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
59. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
60. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
61. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 85 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376). The
four part test of O'Brien must also be satisfied for the legislation to be held constitu-
tional. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
62. Id. (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 47). The Supreme Court in Renton acknowl-
edged that although a zoning ordinance treats theaters that specialize in adult
films differently than other kinds of theaters, it was not focusing on the content of
the films shown at adult motion picture theaters, but rather on the secondary effects
of such theaters on the surrounding community. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. The sec-
ondary effects doctrine desires to suppress crime and has nothing to do with the
actual films being shown inside the adult movie theater. Id. at 50. The ordinance
was explicitly designed to prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, and main-
tain property values. Id. at 48. The ordinance was not designed to suppress the
expression of unpopular views. Id. Furthermore, the ordinance did not ban adult
theaters altogether. It merely provided that such theaters may not be located
within certain areas. Id. at 46.
1996]
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nance at issue in Renton and concluded both to be content-neutral
regulations, unrelated to the suppression of speech. 63
The court in American Library Ass'n next examined the purpose
of Congress' adoption of the section 2257 record-keeping require-
ments.6 The court concluded that the sole purpose for the adop-
tion of section 2257 was to address an important deficiency in the
Child Protection Act of 1984.65 The Child Protection Act of 1984
contained a loophole that enabled the continued exploitation of
children by failing to address how one ascertains the real ages of
performers from a visual depiction.66 The court concluded that the
congressional purpose in enacting the record-keeping provision
was threefold: (1) to prevent the exploitation of children by requir-
ing those responsible for photographing or videotaping sexually ex-
plicit acts to secure proof of the performer's age and maintain such
records as evidence of their compliance; (2) to deprive child
pornographers access to commercial markets by requiring secon-
dary producers to inspect the primary producers' proof that the
persons depicted were adults at the time they were photographed
or videotaped and (3) to establish a system by which law enforce-
ment officers in possession of materials containing depictions of
sexually explicit acts will be able to identify the performers and ver-
ify compliance with the Child Protection Act.67
The court dismissed the challengers' claim that the Child Pro-
tection Act was content-based, regardless of its stated purposes. 68
The court concluded that the focus of the Child Protection Act was
justified without any reference to the speech content.69 The court
stated that it was clear that Congress enacted the Act not to regulate
63. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 86. Section 2257 does not ban all sexu-
ally explicit materials; it only imposes certain requirements on individuals who pro-
duce these materials. Id. Likewise, the zoning ordinance in Renton does not ban
all adult theaters but merely places restrictions on where they may be located. Id.
64. Id. at 84-85.
65. Id. at 85.
66. Id. The court reviewed the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography
which found the existing child protection laws deficient in several aspects. Id. See
ArroRNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON POPNOGR 'HY, supra note 21, at 620.
67. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 86.
68. Id. The appellees argued that a strict scrutiny standard should be applied
because the requirements are triggered by speech of a particular content. Id.
69. Id. The court also stated that a valid basis for according differential treat-
ment to even a content-defined subclass of proscribable speech exists when the
subclass happens to be associated with particular secondary effects of the speech.
Id. (citing RAN. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992)).
[Vol. III: p. 589
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the content of sexually explicit materials, but to protect children by
deterring the production and distribution of child pornography. 70
Additionally, the court dismissed the challengers' claim that
section 2257 was content-based because the record-keeping and dis-
closure provisions were so burdensome that they would chill or
limit some constitutionally protected speech.71 The court reasoned
that the mere assertion of some possible self-censorship does not
render a law unconstitutional. 72 The court again focused on the
purpose of the Child Protection Act, to prevent the use of underage
performers in the production of sexually explicit materials, and
concluded that since the First Amendment did not afford protec-
tion to such conduct, the Act's requirements were not content-
based.73
The court reasoned that the Child Protection Act satisfied the
content-neutral formulation established in O'Brien because the pro-
ducers of sexually explicit materials engage in conduct that poten-
tially contains both protected speech (sexually explicit adult
performers) and unprotected speech (sexually explicit underage
performers); and the Act targets only the latter.74 The court deter-
mined the test was reduced to intermediate scrutiny because the
record-keeping and disclosure requirements were deemed content-
neutral. 75 The test examined the Child Protection Act to deter-
mine whether its requirements were narrowly tailored to serve a sig-
nificant governmental interest and leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information. 76
70. Id.
71. Id. at 87. The challengers relied on several cases including FEC v. Massa-
chusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 254, 256 (1986) (addressing federal
restriction on expenditures from corporation's treasury funds in election cam-
paign). The challengers claimed that the government should not chill constitu-
tionally protected speech and that the Child Protection Act's record-keeping and
disclosure restrictions create a disincentive to engage in protected speech. Ameri-
can Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 87 (citing Massachusetts Citizens, 479 U.S. at 254). The
court distinguished American Library Ass'n from Massachusetts Citizens and other
cases because the record-keeping and disclosure restrictions in 18 U.S.C. § 2257
involve neither political speech nor direct restraints on speech-related expendi-
tures. Id.
72. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 87 (citing Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indi-
ana, 489 U.S. 46, 60 (1989)).
73. Id. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-66 (1982)).
74. Id. The court also recognized that while the effects of the Act's record-
keeping requirements on speech are not insubstantial, they are incidental and
largely unavoidable. Id. at 87-88.
75. Id. at 88.
76. Id. See also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
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2. Application of Intermediate Scrutiny Test
The sole challenge in application of the intermediate scrutiny
test was whether the Child Protection Act's record-keeping require-
ments were narrowly tailored to the objective of preventing child
pornography. 77 The court concluded that a regulation would meet
the Supreme Court's "narrowly tailored" requirement if a substan-
tial portion of the burden it imposes furthers the Government's in-
terest, even though a less intrusive alternative might exist.78
The court reasoned that the requirements of section 2257 ad-
vanced the prevention of child pornography in three major ways.
First, the requirements ensure that primary producers actually con-
firm that a potential performer is not a minor.79 Second, the re-
quirements deter children from attempting to portray themselves
as adults.8 0 Third, the requirements create the only mechanism by
which secondary producers, or those who have no contact with the
performers, can be required to ascertain the ages of the performers
pictured in the materials they will be producing.81 Without the pri-
mary producers' records, the secondary producers could always
plead honest mistake.82
The challengers argued that the regulation was not narrowly
tailored to abate child pornography for several reasons. First, they
claimed that nearly all producers providing sexually explicit materi-
als for commercial markets already require age verification of some
kind.8 3 Second, they argued that the "reasonable mistake" defense
was not practically available in child pornography cases.84 This de-
fense only exists for those who have "diligently investigated" the
77. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 88. The challengers in this action did
not deny that the government had a significant, even compelling interest in
preventing child pornography. Id. at 88. They also conceded that the Act leaves
open ample avenues for the communication of sexually explicit materials. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 88-89.
80. Id. at 89.
81. Id.
82. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 89. The Attorney General's Commission
on Pornography found that in trying to appeal to the child pornography market,
producers often used very young-looking performers to give the impression that
they were minors. Prosecution, however, was hindered because only in the most
obvious cases, could they ascertain whether the performers were really under the
age of 18. Secondary producers professed ignorance that they were actually deal-
ing with sexual materials involving children. Primary producers themselves
claimed they were misled about the performer's age or the performer's true iden-
tity. American Library Ass'n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
83. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 89.
84. Id. The Ninth Circuit recognizes a very narrow mistake of age defense.
See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
(Vol. III: p. 589
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performer's age. Essentially, this requires the producer to view
some identification documents before he begins filming. 5 The
court rejected both of these arguments.8 6
The majority also dismissed the challengers' overbreadth argu-
ment. Challengers contended that both the record-keeping re-
quirements and the labeling requirements of section 2257 were
substantially overinclusive.8 7 The government contended, however,
that the purpose of the Child Protection Act was to prevent subjec-
tive age determinations by installing a uniform procedure that ap-
plies to all performers. 8  The court stated, "[t]he Government
must be allowed to paint with a reasonably broad brush if it is to
cover depictions of all performers who might conceivably have
been minors at the time they were photographed or videotaped."8 9
Challengers also argued that because the Child Protection Act
mainly applied to adult performers, it primarily burdens protected
speech and is therefore void under Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New
York State Crime Victims' Board.90 However, the court held that the
Act burdens only that protected speech necessary to advance the
government's interest in abating child pornography.9 1 Unlike the
law at issue in Simon & Schuster, the Child Protection Act's imposi-
85. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 89. In opposition to this claim, the gov-
ernment argued that the record-keeping requirements imposed on the primary
producers must remain elements of the statute for they are "critical to ensuring
that secondary producers deny child pornographers access to their markets." Id.
86. Id. The court added that even if these assertions were correct, "the rec-
ord-keeping obligations imposed on primary producers remain elements of the
statutory scheme that are critical to ensuring that secondary producers deny child
pornographers access to their markets." Id.
87. Id. at 89-90. Appellees contended that since very little commercially pro-
duced child pornography exists, the Act is overbroad because it applies almost
entirely to constitutionally protected depictions of adults. Id. at 90.
88. Id. The court compares the Child Protection Act to 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b),
which requires employers to verify and maintain proof of every employee's right to
work in the United States. Id. Both of these statutes contain uniform procedures
applicable to all employees.
89. Id. The court did not find a need to address all applications of the record-
keeping requirements at this time. The court stated, "'[t]hese cases do not re-
quire us to identify or define what affirmative limits the Constitution may impose
[because] [t]hose are best determined in case-by-case tests.' " Id. (quoting Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985)).
90. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 90. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New
York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991). The "Son of Sam" statute,
therein, required that if a criminal profited from a book describing his crime, the
money earned must be paid into an escrow fund to benefit his or her victims. Id.
at 108. The Court found that a compelling interest existed in ensuring that victims
of crime are compensated by those who harm them. Id. at 123. However, the
Court concluded that the law was "significantly overinclusive" because it applied to
an overly large number of protected works. Id. at 122-23.
91. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 90.
1996]
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tion of such requirements on sexually explicit materials and per-
formers is essential to achieving Congress' goal of preventing child
pornography.92
The final issue that the court addressed involved whether the
record-keeping and labeling requirements of the Child Protection
Act were overly burdensome. The court held that the record-keep-
ing requirements were not onerous as to primary or secondary pro-
ducers.93 Section 2257 was compared with such records routinely
required to facilitate enforcement of immigration, labor and tax
laws. 9 4 The court determined that the Child Protection Act best
serves law enforcement efficiency by requiring verification records
to be available at a single location and best serves the government's
interests by denying commercial markets to child pornographers.95
In addition, the court held that the labeling requirements were
not onerous as to primary or secondary producers. 96 The court
92. Id. Both the Child Protection Act and the statute in Simon & Schuster
satisfy the compelling interest prong, however, the statute in Simon & Schuster
failed to satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at
123. Simon & Schuster involved a law challenged as overbroad because the statute
reached a wide range of literature, applied to any author regardless of whether he
was actually accused or convicted, and did not affect any of the criminal's other
assets. Id. For a further discussion of Simon & Schuster, see supra note 90.
93. American Libraty Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 91-93.
94. Id. at 91; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b) (1982) (requires employers to verify
identities of employees and maintain proof of verification); 29 C.F.R.
§ 516.2 (a) (3) (1993) (requires employers to verify their employees' birthdates); 26
C.F.R. § 31.6001-2(a) (1) (i) (1993) (requires employers to maintain records of em-
ployees' names and addresses).
95. American Libraiy Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 91. The challengers contended that the
time requirement for keeping such records unacceptably burdens speech. Id. The
court responded by replacing the statutory requirement that these records be
maintained as long as the producer remains in business and for five years thereaf-
ter with a standard period of five years, whether or not the producer continues in
existence. Id. The challengers also contended that the Child Protection Act's re-
quirement that producers ascertain any name ever used by the performer in ac-
cordance with 18 U.S.C. § 2257(b) (2) is virtually impossible and does not deter
child pornography. Id. at 91-92. The court and the government interpreted this
section as merely requiring that the producer record the aliases and other names
provided by the performer in response to a request. Id. at 92. Furthermore, the
court held that the cross-referencing of records does abate child pornography be-
cause it allows law enforcement officers to locate different documents for compari-
son of ages. Id.
96. Id. The Child Protection Act requires that statements identifying where
records are kept should be printed near the beginning of a book or magazine, or
placed at the beginning or end of a film or videotape. Id. The Act imposes this
requirement only on those who "produce[ ] any book, magazine, periodical, film,
videotape, or other matter which ... contains... depictions ... of actual sexually
explicit conduct." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2257(a) (1) (1988 & Supp. H 1990)). Fur-
thermore, the Act defines "produces" to mean "produce, manufacture, or publish
any [sexually explicit material] ... and includes the duplication, reproduction, or
[Vol. III: p. 589
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ruled that requiring producers to affix statements to sexually ex-
plicit materials, identifying where proof of the depicted perform-
ers' age may be found is permissible. 97 The court reasoned that the
"creation of records is of little avail if they cannot be readily
located."98
3. Dissenting Opinions
Judge Reynolds' dissent argued that the Child Protection Act
was overbroad, chilling and a non-effective deterrent to child por-
nography.99 He first stated that the statute regulates a wide variety
of material. 100 According to Judge Reynolds, although some of this
material is obscene and "non-protected," some of it is only "inde-
cent" speech and deserves First Amendment protection. 01 The
Reynolds' dissent also reasoned that the statute might have been
content-based because it is directed at a particular type of expres-
sion and has more than an "incidental limitation" on First Amend-
ment protected speech.10 2 Judge Reynolds' final contention was
that the Child Protection Act does not serve as a deterrent. 03 He
argued that the Child Protection Act could not be used for its in-
tended purpose of helping to prosecute child pornographers, "be-
reissuing of any such matter." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2257(h) (3) (1988 & Supp. II
1990)).
97. Id. at 92. The court also addressed the challengers' contention that these
labeling requirements will compromise the "artistic integrity" of photographic ex-
hibits in galleries. Id. at 93. The court dismissed the idea as "sheer speculation"
not relevant to the constitutional issues at hand, but suggested that such state-
ments may be affixed to the back of pictures in galleries so as to not interfere with
aesthetics. Id.
98. Id. at 92.
99. Id. at 94 (Reynolds, J., dissenting). Judge Reynolds argued that the major-
ity opinion allows an unwarranted intrusion into the First Amendment rights of
citizens who are not child pornographers. Id. (Reynolds, J., dissenting).
100. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 94 (Reynolds, J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Reynolds, J., dissenting). Reynolds argued that the trend in
Supreme Court cases appears to relax the standard of review for "indecent"
speech. Id. at 94-95 (Reynolds, J., dissenting); see Sable Communications v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115 (1989) (holding ban on indecent telephone message services violated
First Amendment because it exceeded what was necessary to serve compelling in-
terest of preventing exposure of minors to messages); see also, American Library
Ass'n v. Reno, 47 F.3d 1215, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (TatelJ., dissenting) (contend-
ing vast majority of speech regulated by Act protected by First Amendment).
102. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 95 (Reynolds, J., dissenting). Reynolds
argued, "It]here is enough 'bite' left in the O'Brien standard to strike a statute
when it has more than incidental effects on First Amendment expression and does
not effectively further an important governmental interest." Id. (Reynolds, J.,
dissenting).
103. Id. (Reynolds, J., dissenting).
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cause the Act itself precludes the use of the records, directly or
indirectly, in a child pornography prosecution.1 1 04
Subsequently, Judge Tatel of the D.C. Circuit dissented from a
denial of rehearing becase he doubted whether the statute could
accomplish its stated purpose.10 5 His dissent reasoned that produ-
cers who knowingly use minors in sexually explicit productions
were already subject to criminal penalties; therefore, this statute
would not help prosecute them.10 6 According to section 2257(d),
the age and identity records may not be used as evidence "with re-
spect to any violation of law" except the record-keeping statute
itself.' 07
The Tatel dissent also questioned the neutrality of the Act.108
It concluded that the regulatory burden impermissibly targeted a
single class of people. 10 9 The dissent cautioned that possible har-
assment'and physical threatening of identified performers may re-
sult under this system.110 It also determined that the Child
Protection Act would unconstitutionally restrict the flow of pro-
tected speech in galleries, stores and libraries.'11
104. Id. (Reynolds,J. dissenting).
105. American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 47 F.3d 1215, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(Tatel, J., dissenting).
106. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting). The dissent proposed that the statute should
be rewritten to impose criminal liability upon producers who "recklessly" or "negli-
gently" violate the Child Protection Act. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting). But cf United
States v. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994) (Supreme Court read into 18
U.S.C. § 2252 requirement that distributor has "knowledge" that minor is being
used in sexually explicit material).
107. American Library Ass'n, 47 F.3d at 1216 (Tatel, J., dissenting). For a fur-
ther definition and explanation of 18 U.S.C. § 2257, see supra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text.
108. American Library Ass'n, 47 F.3d at 1217 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting). The dissent stated, "whatever marginal deter-
rence the statute achieves may well be overshadowed by its unprecedented imposi-
tion of a permanent and pervasive regulatory burden on a single class of speakers."
Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that mandating contro-
versial artists to reveal their studio or home addresses on their work may subject
them to harassment or physical threats. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
they argued that legal adult models may be inhibited from seeking employment if
their names, photos, ages, addresses or histories are to be associated with their
sexually explicit work. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
111. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting). Judge Tatel added in conclusion of his dissent
from the court's denial of rehearing en banc:
Like so many other First Amendment cases that deal with speech on the
borders of social acceptability, this case is not just about pornography. It
is about all speech. If we ignore our First Amendment guarantees in the
face of words and thoughts that are unpopular, unconventional, or even
detestable, we create precedents that may later be used to silence the
speech we value.
[Vol. III: p. 589
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Throughout its analysis, the court in American Library Ass'n rec-
ognized the importance of determining the proper test to apply to
this potential First Amendment infringement on producers of sexu-
ally explicit material. 112 Because the D.C. Circuit had no precedent
directly on point, it had to rely on a variety of constitutional deci-
sions involving general First Amendment issues.113 The American
Library Ass'n court considered several tests of scrutiny in analyzing
whether the record-keeping requirements of section 2257 were per-
missible. 14 The court determined that the test which should be
applied to this particular case was a relaxed intermediate test, the
O'Brien test.'" 5
This analysis, however, was not appropriate for two reasons.
First, the O'Brien test did not need to be addressed because the Fer-
ber decision is sufficiently controlling.1 6 Ferber holds that regula-
tions restricting child pornography are entirely permissible because
speech of this type is "unprotected."1 7 Therefore, the American Li-
brary Ass'n court did not need to approach the regulations with such
in-depth First Amendment analysis and it should have applied the
Ferber reasoning. Second, the court did not need to apply content-
neutral tests of First Amendment analysis."18 The record-keeping
regulations could have survived strict scrutiny because of the over-
Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
112. American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 84-88 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2610 (1995).
113. No other circuit has yet addressed whether the record-keeping and label-
ing provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2257 unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amend-
ment rights of producers of sexually explicit material.
114. For a full discussion of the First Amendment tests that the court consid-
ered, see supra notes 52-76 and accompanying text.
115. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 87-88. For an explanation of the
O'Brien test, see supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
116. For a full discussion of Ferber, see supra notes 39-43 and accompanying
text.
117. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). The Court explained,
"[w] hen a definable class of material .. . bears so heavily and pervasively on the
welfare of children engaged in its production, we think the balance of the compet-
ing interests is clearly struck and that it is permissible to consider these materials as
without the protection of the First Amendment." Id.
118. The court sets forth the O'Brien test as the applicable test to apply in this
analysis. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 88. However, the court then failed to
solely apply the O'Brien test. Id. Instead, the court chose to combine the O'Brien
test with a relaxed intermediate scrutiny test. Id. The court stated, "[l]ater deci-
sions make clear that once a regulation is deemed content neutral, this inquiry
reduces to whether the requirements 'are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and ... leave open ample alternative channels for commu-
nication of the information.'" Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989)). See also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
1996] 607
19
Eckl: American Library Association v. Reno: Protecting Producers agains
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
608 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
whelming, compelling state interest involved in protecting children
from exploitation.1 19 The court correctly concluded that the rec-
ord-keeping requirements were sufficiently narrowly-tailored to this
compelling state interest. 120
In addition, the court appropriately dismissed the challengers'
overbreadth argument.121 The record-keeping and labeling re-
quirements do not excessively overburden producers or affect more
people than necessary to fulfill the government's compelling objec-
tive. 122 Moreover, the burden is slight in comparison to the benefit
of protecting children from such exploitation.123 The court further
noted that First Amendment speech is not chilled as a result of this
legislation. 124 Producers are still free to appeal to the child pornog-
raphy market by using legal performers who only appear to be
younger.125
The dissent presented two interesting points of discussion.1 26
First, Judge Tatel's dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc
argued that this statute would not help prosecute child pornog-
raphers since the records may not be used as evidence with respect
to any violation of law except the record-keeping statute itself.1 27 If
288, 298, 298 n.8 (1984) (equating O'Brien test with "standard applied to time,
place, or manner restrictions")).
119. The appellees conceded that the government has a significant and com-
pelling interest in the prevention of child pornography. American Library Ass'n,
F.3d at 88 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57 (noting "a State's interest in safeguard-
ing physical and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling")).
120. Id. at 88-89. The court argues that to satisfy this prong, the regulation
need not be the "least restrictive or least intrusive means" of achieving the govern-
ment's interests, nor does it require that there be no other "conceivable alterna-
tive." Id. at 88. For a further discussion of the court's narrow-tailoring analysis, see
supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. For a noteworthy challenge to the ma-
jority's narrow-tailoring analysis, see supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
121. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 89-90.
122. Id. at 90-92.
123. Id. at 92. The court disregarded the challengers' contention that the
requirements were onerous, and determined that the record-keeping and labeling
provisions impose a "nominal burden at best." Id. For a full discussion of the
record-keeping and labeling provisions requirements, see supra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text.
124. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 92.
125. The producer of sexually explicit material always has the choice to hire
older, legal performers who look young. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763
(1982). This alternative provides for the legal non-obscene sexual depiction of
young adults.
126. For a full discussion of the dissenting opinions in American Library Ass'n,
see supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
127. American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 47 F.3d 1215, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(Tatel,J., dissenting). Judge Tatel stated, "[t] his statute will not help prosecute ...
since these records may not be used as evidence 'with respect to any violation of
law' except the record-keeping statute itself." Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citing 18
[Vol. III: p. 589
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this non-deterrence argument is valid, then a narrow tailoring of
the statute may pose problems.' 28 Second, Judge Tatel's dissent
proposed an interesting alternative to the current legislation.
Judge Tatel recommended that instead of enforcing the record-
keeping provisions of section 2257, the legislature could revise the
current child pornography statute.'2 9 The dissent recommended
that a knowledge requirement be stricken from the statute. 130 In
place of the knowledge requirement, it recommended that the stan-
dard be one of recklessness or negligence. If recklessness or negli-
gence were the standard, a mistake of age defense in the
production of child pornography could not be utilized. 31 Produ-
cers would be forced to responsibly check the ages of performers.
Otherwise, producers would face prosecution for recklessly or negli-
gently creating sexually explicit materials involving minors.
Three arguments that the Tatel dissent proposed lack substan-
tial merit.' 32 First, the dissent argued that this regulatory burden
targets a single class of speakers.133 Such an argument suggests that
sexually explicit producers are targeted because of the content of
the materials they produce. This argument is not entirely accurate
because the regulations do not intend to reduce the production of
sexually explicit materials of adults.' 4 Producers are free to pro-
U.S.C. § 2257(d) (1988 & Supp. II 1990)). Judge Tatel further added that the
"only class of producers whose behavior this statute is likely to influence ... [are]
those who ignore the age of their models but would nonetheless refuse to employ
individuals they knew were minors. . . " Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
128. The dissent contended that the record-keeping and disclosure provisions
will not deter producers from employing minors. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting). Addi-
tionally, Judge Tatel argued that producers who fail to acquire such records may
only be prosecuted with violation of the record-keeping statute, not with violation
of child pornography production. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting). The dissent also ar-
gued under section 2257(d) that the record "info" may not be used as evidence in
the prosecution of a producer of sexually explicit material involving children. Id.
(Tatel, J,, dissenting). Therefore, the dissent concluded that the statute's require-
ments are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to the governmental objective of pro-
tecting children. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 1216-17 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
132. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dis-
senting arguments.
133. American Libray Ass'n, 47 F.3d at 1217 (Tatel,J., dissenting). Judge Tatel
noted "whatever marginal deterrence the statute achieves may well be overshad-
owed by its unprecedented imposition of a permanent and pervasive regulatory
burden on a single class of speakers." Id. (TatelJ., dissenting).
134. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 85. Congress enacted the Child Protec-
tion Act not to target producers or to regulate the content of sexually explicit
materials, but to protect children, by deterring the production and distribution of
child pornography. Id. However, under a Ferber analysis, one may argue that be-
1996]
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duce as much sexually explicit material of adult performers as they
desire.
Second, the Tatel dissent argued that harassment and physical
threat of identified performers is likely to occur since primary pro-
ducers, secondary producers and the police will have access to iden-
tification of performers of such controversial material.13 5 This
argument is especially weak when one considers who will actually
maintain the records of such information. Only the primary pro-
ducer who has had contact with the performer will keep such infor-
mation.1 36 Producers of sexually explicit material are not likely to
harass or physically threaten potential performers from whom they
will profit, and police are forbidden by law to harass or physically
threaten performers. The age and identity records will not be dis-
closed to the public or published so as to cause any potential threat
of harassment. 37
Third, the Tatel dissent argued that these record-keeping re-
quirements would restrict the "flow" within galleries, stores and li-
braries by artists and adults who appreciate such material for its
literary, artistic or social value.' 38 The challengers in American Li-
brary Ass'n suggested that galleries would be overburdened and ar-
tistic integrity would suffer if statements must be attached to the
front of each picture indicating where the original record of the
model's age was located. 3 9 The court held that this identification
statement can easily be attached to the back of the painting. 140 The
court in American Library Ass'n further dismissed such hypotheticals
as "sheer speculation" and admonished that the statute is not
meant to be stretched out to such extremes.' 4'
cause the whole area of child pornography is "unprotected," we need not worry
about child pornography producers as a class. For a further discussion of Ferber,
see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
135. American Library Ass'n, 47 F.3d at 1217 (Tatel,J., dissenting). The dissent
mistakenly assumed that performers will have to reveal their studio or home ad-
dresses on the face of their work which may subject them to risk of harassment and
physical abuse. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
136. See 18 U.S.C § 2257(c)(1988 & Supp. II 1990).
137. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 94. The information will not be dis-
closed to anyone other than the Attorney General or his delegee, the primary pro-
ducers for whom they willingly posed while engaged in sexual acts, and those who
publish the pictures or videotapes. Id. The court added in conclusion, " [t] he first
of these has a legitimate right to the information, and we believe we may safely
assume that the performers are not concerned over the prospect of being stigma-
tized, harassed, or ridiculed by the producers they help enrich." Id.
138. American Libraiy Ass'n 47 F.3d at 1217 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
139. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 93.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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The court in American Library Ass'n took an important step to
ensure the protection and prevention of sexual exploitation of chil-
dren. 142 Child pornography threatens not only our children, but
also our society as a whole. The American Library Ass'n court recog-
nized the importance of legislation in this area.143 Supporting the
constitutionality of section 2257 will help combat the social ills of
child pornography production.
The record-keeping and labeling requirements of section 2257
will reduce the vulnerability of children and make producers more
responsible.44 Children will not as easily fall prey to greedy film
producers if the producers are held more accountable for their ac-
tions. The producers will have to ascertain information from the
performer regarding his or her age and will have to keep a record
of it before any film or photo productions may be made.' 45 The
producer must also label his productions with the whereabouts of
the location of such records. 146 As the court in American Library
Ass'n stated, "the creation of records is of little avail if they cannot
be readily located."' 47
These requirements will not overburden or infringe upon the
rights of producers.' 48 Age and identity checks are frequently per-
formed, especially for minors. Such requirements are no more
stringent than those imposed upon establishments with liquor
licenses or licenses to sell tobacco products. Additionally, employ-
ers are always required to verify and maintain records of employees
in order to facilitate the enforcement of our immigration, labor
and tax laws. 149
Further, the record-keeping and labeling provisions will not
chill free speech.' 50 The Child Protection Act's requirements
142. For a full discussion of the reasoning in American Library Ass'n, see supra
notes 52-98 and accompanying text.
143. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 81.
144. A-rroRNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 21, at
621-22.
145. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(b) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(e) (1988 & Supp. I 1990). For a statutory definition of
this labeling requirement, see supra note 24.
147. American Library Ass'n, 47 F.3d at 92.
148. See id. at 89-90.
149. Id. at 91 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b) (1982); 26 C.F.R. § 31.6001-2(a) (1) (i)
(1993); and 29 C.F.R. § 516.2(a) (3) (1993)).
150. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 92. For a discussion of the effects of the
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neither target nor affect the legal production of sexually explicit
material involving adults. 151 Producers are still free to employ adult
performers of legal age who look young in order to attract this
market. 152
Finally, these requirements will aid in the prosecution of child
pornography producers because compliance with the Act will help
prove scienter and knowledge elements of child pornography stat-
utes. 153 The Act will also prevent producers from using the "I
didn't know how old she was, honest?" excuse when they are caught
exploiting minors in their productions.TM Section 2257's intended
aim is to increase producer accountability and responsibility. By
holding producers of sexually explicit material more accountable,
section 2257 of the Child Protection Act will, in turn, reduce the
vulnerability and exploitation of our children.
Lisa L. Eckl
151. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 92. See supra notes 74, 122 & 123 and
accompanying text.
152. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
153. Currently, 36 states require the prosecution to show that a defendant in
violation of a child pornography statute had "knowledge" that the actor was a mi-
nor. Robert R. Strang, "She Was Just Seventeen. .. And The Way She Looked Was Way
Beyond [Her Years],"90 COLUM. L. REv. 1779, 1784 n.42 (1990).
154. Currently, five states do not require the prosecution to prove that the
defendant had knowledge of age, but do allow the defendant to raise a mistake of
age defense. Id. at 1784 n.43.
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